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INTRODUCTION
Two centuries ago Chief Justice John Marshall famously wrote
that discretionary choices should not be left to a court's "inclination,
but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal
principles."' Unfortunately, for the next 177 years, federal criminal
sentencing would be largely devoid of the substantive law and proce-
dural rules necessary to guide judicial discretion. Congress passed the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984' (SRA) in response to increasing con-
cern over unwarranted sentencing disparities in federal courts,' thus
creating the first real opportunity for the federal judiciary to develop
a common law of sentencing. The SRA established the United States
Sentencing Commission ("Commission").5 The Commission is charged
with developing and promulgating regulations governing federal sen-
tencing that would emphasize fairness, consistency, punishment (retri-
bution), incapacitation, and deterrence.' To that end, the Commission
designed the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"),
which consisted of a set of mandatory narrow sentencing ranges for
each defendant. The introduction to the Guidelines Manual outlines
three congressionally mandated objectives of sentencing reform: ho-
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4 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983, S Rep No 225, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 59-60
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nesty, uniformity, and proportionality.' Honesty was intended to re-
duce sentencing disparity between time sentenced and time served,
and to clarify the sources actually used to inform sentencing; uniformi-
ty was designed to reduce significantly interjudge disparity in sentenc-
ing for offenders with similar criminal histories and conduct; and pro-
portionality was concerned with sentencing defendants in a manner
consistent with the severity of their particular conduct!
The Guidelines provided limited ranges in which judges were per-
mitted to impose sentences based on a defendant's prior criminal his-
tory, the crime, and specific offense characteristics. The sentencing
judge could make an upward or downward adjustment from the appli-
cable sentencing range upon finding that there were circumstances in
the case that the Guidelines had not adequately taken into account.
Eighteen years after the Guidelines took effect, the Supreme
Court in United States v Booker9 held that the Sixth Amendment re-
quires juries to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, any fact that
the law makes essential to punishment, save a prior conviction." The
Court also struck down the provisions of the SRA requiring (1) feder-
al district judges to impose sentences within the Guidelines range; and
(2) federal appellate courts to review sentences imposed outside the
Guidelines range under a de novo standard." The Court concluded that,
in order to comport with the Constitution, the Guidelines must be
deemed advisory and the federal courts of appeals should review
criminal sentences for "reasonableness."'2 Unfortunately, the Court did
not clearly define what "reasonableness" review would entail. This
ambiguity quickly resulted in a split among the circuits as to how to
determine the reasonableness of a sentence.
Two years later, in Rita v United States," the Supreme Court at-
tempted to clarify how the federal appellate courts should conduct
post-Booker appellate review, ultimately holding that a sentence with-
in the Guidelines range may be presumed "reasonable."'" The Court
also explained that, depending on the particular circumstances, a brief
statement by the trial judge of the reasons for a particular sentence,
pursuant to § 3553(c), was legally sufficient.'5 Almost immediately af-
ter the Rita ruling, the circuits split over the level of specificity re-
7 USSG Ch 1, Pt A, intro comment 3.
8 Id.
9 543 US 220 (2005).
10 Id at 241-44.
11 See id at 259.
12 Id at 259-61.
13 127 S Ct 2456 (2007).
14 See id at 2462.
15 See id.
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quired for a judge's statement of reasons. This Comment explores the
circuits' conflicting readings of the Booker and Rita rulings with respect
to the adequacy of judges' sentencing explanations and argues that a
sentence is procedurally reasonable only when the appellate court can
follow, recreate, and assess the district court's basis for the sentence. Not
only is this conclusion supported by Booker and Rita's emphasis on the
importance of thoroughly reasoned sentencing opinions for the evolu-
tion of the Guidelines, but also by the SRA's focus on increased trans-
parency and rationality in the sentencing process.
This Comment proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses the structure
and mechanics of the Guidelines. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Booker and its impact on sentencing. Part III ex-
amines the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Rita that attempts to clari-
fy federal appellate review in the post-Booker regime. Part IV discusses
the current circuit split over the interpretation of Rita as it pertains to
§ 3553(c), the provision of the SRA requiring sentencing judges to
openly state their reasons for imposing a particular sentence. Part V
discusses the centrality of explicit and thoroughly reasoned sentencing
explanations to SRA's vision of the federal judiciary's role in the devel-
opment of sentencing policy and procedures. It proposes that the First
and Sixth Circuits' reading of Rita-that a sentence is procedurally un-
reasonable when neither the context nor the record clearly reveals the
district court's consideration of relevant § 3553(a) factors and the rea-
soning for imposing the sentence-most closely comports with both the
purpose and text of the SRA, and with meaningful sentencing reform
more generally.
i. SENTENCING GUIDELINES PRE-BOOKER
The initial guidelines adopted by the Commission became effective
on November 1, 1987. The centerpiece of the Guidelines is a grid con-
taining 258 cells." The grid's vertical axis consists of forty-three offense
levels, reflecting a base severity score for the crime committed." The
grid's horizontal axis consists of six criminal history categories and pro-
vides adjustments based on the offender's past conviction record.18 The
Guidelines instruct judges on how to calculate both "offense level" and
"criminal history." In determining the defendant's offense level, the
judge chooses the offense guideline corresponding to the defendant's
conviction, determines the base level from the guideline, and adjusts
the offense level for specific offense characteristics and special in-
16 USSG Ch 5, Pt A.
17 USSG Ch 5, Pt A, comment (n 1).
18 Id.
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structions contained in the section.19 After determining the offense
level, the judge determines the defendant's criminal history category.
The judge then identifies the cell at which the two factors intersect;
this cell lists the range within which the judge may sentence the de-
fendant. The judge may depart from the applicable Guidelines range
when the defendant's criminal history category does not adequately
reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the
likelihood of recidivism.) The range within each cell is relatively small,
with the highest point typically 25 percent greater than the lowest
point, thereby limiting judicial sentencing discretion in that range."
The Guidelines also permit judges to depart from the specified sen-
tencing range upon a finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances
of a kind not adequately taken into consideration by the Commission."
Depending on the nature of the circumstance, either an upward or
downward variance may be justified or required. Section 3553(c) of the
SRA requires judges to state the specific reasons for imposing a sentence:
The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the
reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the
sentence -
(1) is of the kind, and within the range, described in subsection
(a)(4) and that range exceeds 24 months, the reason for impos-
ing a sentence at a particular point within the range; or
(2) is not of the kind, or is outside the range, described in sub-
section (a)(4), the specific reason for the imposition of a sen-
tence different from that described ....
Congress believed these § 3553(c) sentencing statements would enable
judges to draw upon their unique experiences and develop a dialogue
about sentencing law and policy."
II. SENTENCING GUIDELINES POST-BOOKER
In Booker, the Court held that the Guidelines violated defen-
dants' Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury by allowing judges, ra-
ther than juries, to make factual findings necessary to increase a de-
19 Id at § 1B1.1.
20 Id at § 4A1.3(a) policy statement.
21 28 USC § 994(b)(2) (2000 & Supp 2004).
22 USSG § 5K2.0(a)(2) policy statement. See also Koon v United States, 518 US 81,98 (1996)
(explaining that a district court's decision to depart will usually be given substantial deference
since district courts have the institutional advantage over appellate courts in evaluating fac-
tual circumstances).
23 See 18 USC § 3553(c) (2000 & Supp 2004).
24 Senate Report at 61 (cited in note 4). See also Part V.A.
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fendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum6 The Court sal-
vaged the Guidelines to a large extent, however, by holding that they
were permissible if viewed as advisory rather than mandatory.6 The
Guidelines were to be consulted by judges imposing a sentence, and such
sentences would be upheld upon appeal as long as they were not "unrea-
sonable."27 To make the Guidelines advisory instead of mandatory, the
Court severed and excised two statutory provisions of the SRA:
§ 3553(b)(1), which required that the trial judge impose a sentence within
the Guidelines range, and § 3742(e), which mandated de novo review of
departures.M The Court reasoned that the excision of § 3742(e) was not "a
critical problem for the handling of appeals" post-Booker because the
SRA implied "a practical standard of review already familiar to appellate
courts: review for unreasonableness. ' 21 In Booker, Justice Stephen Breyer
called on Congress to amend the SRA to conform to the Court's consti-
tutional requirements; however, to date, Congress has made no such
effort." The Court subsequently noted that Booker failed to include an
elaborate discussion of the reasonableness standard,32 and would later
remark that "[s]imply stated, Booker replaced the de novo standard of
review required by [§ 3742(e)] with an abuse-of-discretion standard that
[the Court referred to as] 'reasonableness review.'',33
Booker also indicated that part of reasonableness review requires
the appellate court to consider whether the district court accounted
for relevant § 3553(a) factors and "[t]hose factors in turn will guide
[the] appellate court[] ... in determining whether a sentence is unrea-
sonable." Under the now-advisory Guidelines, the Commission re-
mains in place to collect and study information about actual district
court sentencing decisions as well as appellate court decisionmaking,
amending the Guidelines in light of its findings.35 According to the
Court, "These features of the remaining system, while not the system
25 543 US at 243-44. The Booker ruling reaffirmed the Court's earlier positions in Apprendi v
New Jersey, 530 US 466,490 (2000), and Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296,303-04 (2004).
26 See Booker, 543 US at 259.
27 Id at 260-61.
28 Idat265.
29 Id at 260-61.
30 See 543 US at 265 ("Ours, of course, is not the last word: The ball now lies in Congress'
court. The National Legislature is equipped to devise and install, long term, the sentencing system,
compatible with the Constitution, that Congress judges best for the federal system of justice.").
31 Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Revisit Thorny Issue of Sentencing Guidelines in First
Cases after Recess, NY Times A15 (Feb 20,2007).
32 Cunningham v California, 127 S Ct 856,867 & n 13 (2007).
33 Rita, 127 S Ct at 2470-71.
34 543 Us at 261.
35 Id at 263-64.
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Congress enacted, nonetheless continue to move sentencing in Con-
gress' preferred direction.""
Following Booker, a majority of the circuit courts has endorsed a
two-stage approach to sentencing:" (1) calculate the applicable pre-
Booker Guidelines range, including a determination as to whether a
departure is appropriate; and (2) examine factors specified in § 3553(a)38
to determine whether a sentence outside the range is warranted.39 In
contrast, the Seventh Circuit has held that Booker made the determina-
tion of departures "obsolete."
Seven circuits have also held that the advisory-Guidelines range
is presumptively reasonable if it was properly calculated and the sen-
tencing court considered the other § 3553(a) factors.1 Even prior to the
36 Id at 264-65.
37 United States v Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F3d 514, 518-19 (1st Cir 2006) (en banc); United
States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103, 111-13 (2d Cir 2005); United States v Cooper, 437 F3d 324, 330 (3d
Cir 2006); United States v Hughes, 401 F3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir 2005); United States v Mares, 402
F3d 511,518-19 (5th Cir 2005); United States v Buchanan, 449 F3d 731,734 (6th Cir 2006); United
States v Haack, 403 F3d 997, 1002-03 (8th Cir 2005); United States v Menyweather, 447 F3d 625,
630 (9th Cir 2006); United States v Talley, 431 F3d 784,786 (11th Cir 2005).
38 Section 3553 states:
(a) The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider-
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to pro-
vide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocation training, medical
care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
18 USC § 3553(a)(2).
39 The appellate courts generally do not require district courts to specify how each § 3553(a)
factor is taken into account. See, for example, United States v Lopez-Flores, 444 F3d 1218, 1222
(10th Cir 2006). But see United States v Miranda, 505 F3d 785, 792 (7th Cir 2007). The Miranda
court acknowledged that a district judge need not entertain arguments obviously lacking in
merit. See id. However, it did require that a judge explain why a sentence imposed is appropriate
in light of § 3553(a) factors when a defendant makes a nonfrivolous argument challenging a
within-Guidelines sentence as unreasonable. See id.
40 See United States v Laufle, 433 F3d 981, 986-87 (7th Cir 2006) (analyzing that since
Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory and district courts now have much broader authority
to sentence outside the recommended range, departures are "beside the point").
41 See United States v Dorcely, 454 F3d 366, 376 (DC Cir 2006); United States v Cage, 451
F3d 585, 591 (10th Cir 2006); United States v Johnson, 445 F3d 339, 341 (4th Cir 2006); United
States v Williams, 436 F3d 706, 707-08 (6th Cir 2006); United States v Mykytiuk, 415 F3d 606, 608
(7th Cir 2005); United States v Lincoln, 413 F3d 716, 717 (8th Cir 2005); Mares, 402 F3d at 519.
But see Talley, 431 F3d at 788 (holding that although a sentence within the Guidelines range is
not per se reasonable, the party challenging the sentence bears the burden of establishing unrea-
sonableness). Later the Supreme Court would state, "The fact that we permit courts of appeals to
adopt a presumption of reasonableness does not mean that courts may adopt a presumption of
unreasonableness." Rita, 127 S Ct at 2467.
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Rita ruling, however, several circuits noted that a sentence imposed out-
side the Guidelines range is not presumptively unreasonable. '2
In sum, all the members of the Booker Court recognized that
there would be no constitutional problem with mandatory sentencing
guidelines if the facts serving as the basis for upward departures were
required to be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt." By making the Guidelines advisory, the Court allowed judges
to retain discretion in applying upward and downward departures with-
out additional jury factfinding beyond a reasonable doubt." Although
the second part of the Booker opinion (the remedial decision) appears
to be somewhat in tension with the first part of the decision, which held
the Guidelines unconstitutional," several circuits have held that the
exercise of such discretion after Booker is constitutionally permissible. "
Twenty-two months after the Booker decision, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in two cases- United States v Claiborne' 7 and United
States v Rita4"-in order to clarify the "reasonableness" standard of
appellate review." In Claiborne, a case from the Eighth Circuit, the
Court was asked to decide whether a sentence below the correctly
calculated Guidelines range is reasonable and whether a sentence that
substantially varies from the Guidelines range must be justified by
extraordinary circumstances. The Eighth Circuit's holding in Clai-
borne, however, was vacated as moot after the petitioner, Mario Clai-
42 See United States v Howard, 454 F3d 700, 703 (7th Cir 2006); United States v Myers, 439
F3d 415,417 (8th Cir 2006); United States v Moreland, 437 F3d 424, 433-34 (4th Cir 2006); United
States v Foreman, 436 F3d 638,644 (6th Cir 2006).
43 543 US at 233.
44 Id at 251 (explaining that the Court's earlier decisions permitted the judge to rely on
facts unproven by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt for sentencing purposes), citing United
States v Watts, 519 US 148,157 (1997).
45 Douglas A. Berman and Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 Ohio St J Crim
L 37, 53 (2006) ("The dual rulings in Booker reflect two divergent conceptual and procedural
models competing for dominance.").
46 See, for example, United States v Welch, 429 F3d 702,704-05 (7th Cir 2005); United States
v Chau, 426 F3d 1318, 1323-24 (11th Cir 2005); United States v Edwards, 424 F3d 1106, 1108 (DC
Cir 2005); United States v Bothun, 424 F3d 582, 587-88 (7th Cir 2005); United States v Ameline,
409 F3d 1073,1077-78 (9th Cir 2005) (en banc).
To be sure, there remains disagreement among legal scholars and practitioners as to what the
holding in Booker actually is, because the remedial opinion lends itself to different interpreta-
tions. Although several lower courts have interpreted the Guidelines as nonbinding, they have
tended to base their reasonableness determination on whether the sentence conforms to the
Guidelines. And as noted earlier, there is disagreement among the lower courts as to how much
weight should be accorded to the Guidelines. See note 39.
47 United States v Claiborne, 429 F3d 479 (8th Cir 2006).
48 United States v Rita, 177 Fed Appx 357 (4th Cir 2006), reversed and remanded in Rita v
United States, 127 S Ct 2456 (2007).
49 Claiborne v United States, 127 S Ct 551 (2006); Rita v United States, 127 S Ct 551 (2006).
50 See Claiborne, 127 S Ct 551.
2008] 1891
The University of Chicago Law Review
borne, died on May 30,2007."1 In Rita, the Court was asked to determine
whether a sentence that was within the correctly calculated guidelines
was presumptively reasonable and whether the sentencing judge must
still examine factors that would justify a lesser sentence if the sentence
was within the Guidelines range.2 The Court rendered its decision in
Rita on June 21, 2007, but less than two months later the circuits again
were split over the appropriate manner in which to conduct appellate
review under the post-Booker framework. The next Part discusses the
Rita decision and its impact on appellate review.
III. RITA AND APPELLATE REVIEW IN THE POST-BOOKER ERA
A. Rita's Road to the Supreme Court
Victor Rita was convicted in the United States District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina." Pursuant to § 3552(a), a pro-
bation officer prepared a presentence report (PSR) describing offense
characteristics, offender characteristics, other matters deemed relevant
to sentencing, and factors potentially relevant to a departure from the
guidelines." According to the PSR, the Guidelines specified a sentence
from thirty-three to forty-one months of imprisonment.
During the sentencing hearing, both Rita and the government of-
fered their sentencing arguments, referencing the probation officer's
PSR. Rita sought a sentence lower than the recommended Guidelines
range of thirty-three to forty-one months based upon § 3553(a) be-
cause of his physical condition, his likely vulnerability in prison due to
his work in government service, and his military experience." Rita pre-
51 See Claiborne v United States, 127 S Ct 2245 (2007). The Supreme Court granted certi-
orari in two new cases, United States v Kimbrough, 174 Fed Appx 798 (4th Cir 2006), and United
States v Gall, 446 F3d 884 (8th Cir 2006), to address below-Guidelines sentences. Kimbrough v
United States, 127 S Ct 2933 (2007); Gall v United States, 127 S Ct 2933 (2007). On December 10,
2007, the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's requirement of "extraordinary" circumstances to
justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range, ruling that "[r]egardless of whether the sentence
imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range, the appellate court must review the sentence
under an abuse-of-discretion standard." Gall v United States, 128 S Ct 586,597 (2007). Recall that
the Court in Booker referred to the abuse-of-discretion standard as "reasonableness review." See
text accompanying note 33. On the same day, the Court also held that although Booker requires
district courts to give respectful consideration to the Guidelines, sentencing judges are permitted
to particularize sentences in light of other § 3553(a) factors. See Kimbrough v United States, 128
S Ct 558, 574-75 (2007) (emphasizing the sentencing judge's greater familiarity with the individ-
ual case and defendant).
52 See Rita, 127 S Ct 2456.
53 Rita was convicted of perjury, obstruction of justice, and making false statements. Rita,
177 Fed Appx at 358.
54 Rita, 127 S Ct at 2460-61.
55 The Court acknowledged that in sentencing Rita, the judge had considered that "Rita
had previously worked in the immigration service where he had been involved in detecting
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sented evidence and arguments related to the three aforementioned
factors, after which the trial judge asked questions about each factor
before making his ruling.6 After hearing the arguments from both Rita
and the government, the trial judge concluded that the PSR's suggested
range was appropriate and sentenced Rita to thirty-three months."7
Rita appealed his sentence to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that (1) his
sentence was unreasonable because it was greater than necessary to
comply with the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a)(2); and
(2) the trial judge did not adequately take into account his unique history
and characteristics. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit issued a per curiam
decision, affirming Rita's sentencing and concluding that a sentence im-
posed within the properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
reasonable. 9 Following affirmation of his sentence Rita petitioned for a
writ of certiorari, noting that the circuits were split over the appropriate-
ness of the use of a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines
sentences The Supreme Court subsequently granted Rita's petition.
At the time Rita was argued before the Supreme Court, the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and DC Circuits had adopted a pre-
sumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences.6' In con-
trast, the First, Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits had declined to
61
adopt the presumption.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
With respect to Rita's first argument, the Court approved the pre-
sumption of reasonableness that several circuits applied when reviewing
sentences within the recommended guidelines. The Court found that this
presumption comports with both the SRA and the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury.2 In particular, the Court held that (1) the pre-
sumption is in harmony with the SRA's goal of having the sentencing
court subject the defendant's sentence to thorough adversarial testing;
criminal offenses" and that he had served in the military for more than twenty-five years and had
received thirty-five medals, awards, and nominations. Id at 2469.
56 Id at 2462.
57 Id.
58 See note 38.
59 Rita, 177 Fed Appx at 358.
60 See note 41 and accompanying text.
61 See United States v Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F3d 514, 518 (1st Cir 2006) (en banc); United
States v Fernandez, 443 F3d 19, 27 (2d Cir 2006); United States v Cooper, 437 F3d 324, 331 (3d Cir
2006); United States v Talley, 431 F3d 784,788 (11th Cir 2005).
Subsequent to the Rita decision, the Ninth Circuit declined to adopt the presumption. See
United States v Carty, 2008 WL 763770, *6 (9th Cir) (en banc) (explaining that a "presumption
[of reasonableness] carries baggage as an evidentiary concept that [the en banc panel] prefer[s]
not to import").
62 See Rita, 127 S Ct at 2463-68.
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and (2) the Sixth Amendment is not violated since the presumption
applies at the appellate level and does not require the sentencing judge
to impose a certain sentence.63 The Court disagreed that the presump-
tion of reasonableness had recreated the mandatory pre-Booker
scheme. According to the Court, a sentence imposed by the trial court
is permissible so long as it is reasonable in relation to the general sen-
tencing goals articulated in the enacted portions of the SRA. 6 The
Court also commented that the presumption had the benefit of em-
ploying a rule of law with which the courts were already familiar.6
Nevertheless, the Court was clear to point out that although adopting
this presumption was permissible, it was not required. 6' Justice David
Souter, dissenting, cautioned that the majority's ruling would encourage
trial judges simply to impose a sentence within the Guidelines range
rather than go through the factfinding necessary to justify a sentence
outside the range.6
C. Procedural Reasonableness
Rita's second argument was that his sentence was procedurally
unreasonable.6' Recall that after hearing Rita's and the government's
arguments at the sentencing hearing, the trial judge simply remarked
that the PSR's suggested range was not inappropriate.' ° The Court ac-
knowledged that the trial judge's statement was not the legal standard
for the imposition of a sentence, but reasoned that, given the context
of the entire sentencing hearing, the judge understood Rita's argu-
ments." The Court held that the district court's statement of reasons,
63 See id.
64 See id at 2465. But see Paul J. Hofer, Empirical Questions and Evidence in Rita v. United
States, 85 Denver U L Rev 27,31-32 (2007) (discussing empirical evidence revealing that within-
Guidelines sentences are nearly always upheld as substantively reasonable).
65 See Rita, 127 S Ct at 2465.
66 See id at 2470-71 (Stevens concurring).
67 See id at 2463.
68 See id at 2488 (Souter dissenting). See also Nancy Gertner, Rita Needs Gall-How to
Make the Guidelines Advisory, 85 Denver U L Rev 63, 71 (2007) (arguing that the presumption of
reasonableness approved by Rita "will, once again, slide to 'mandatory,' or something short of
that: namely, 'Guidelines-Lite'); Berman and Bibas, 4 Ohio St J Crim L at 70 (cited in note 45)
(cautioning that a presumptive or default system might harden into a mandatory one if the de-
fault system serves as safe harbor against appellate reversal).
69 See Rita, 127 S Ct at 2462. See also id at 2482-83 (Scalia concurring) (explaining that
Booker's "creation of reasonableness review gave appellate courts the necessary means to re-
verse a district court that appears not to have considered § 3553(a); considers impermissible
factors; selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts; or does not comply with § 3553(c)'s
requirement for a statement of reasons" and that "this procedural review will indirectly produce,
over time, reduction of sentencing disparities").
70 Id at 2469.
71 Id.
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while brief, was "legally sufficient" and instructed that "[t]he sentencing
judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has
considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercis-
ing his own legal decision-making authority.'7 2 The Court also recog-
nized that the thoroughness of the explanation required depends on the
circumstances, and noted that a brief explanation would suffice even
when the defendant or the government put forth "nonfrivolous reasons"
for imposing a non-Guidelines sentence. "We cannot read the statute
(or our precedent) as insisting upon a full opinion in every case."" Non-
etheless, "Where the defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous
reasons for imposing a different sentence ... the judge will normally go
further and explain why he has rejected those arguments."'" Although
the Court concluded the district court's § 3553(c) statement was per-
missible, the Court recognized that "the judge might have said more.""
Notwithstanding the Court's particular holding in Rita's case, Justice
Antonin Scalia, in his concurrence (which was joined by Justice Clarence
Thomas), emphasized the importance of the statement of reasons for
appellate review. Similarly, the majority stressed that "[]udicial deci-
sions are reasoned decisions. Confidence in a judge's use of reason un-
derlies the public's trust in the judicial institution."' And "[b]y articulat-
ing reasons, even if brief, the sentencing judge not only assures review-
ing courts (and the public) that the sentencing process is a reasoned
process but also helps that process evolve."'8 Perhaps the Court's most
important statement with respect to § 3553(c) statements and their
relationship to sentencing reform was the following:
The sentencing judge has access to, and greater familiarity with,
the individual case and the individual defendant before him than
the Commission or the appeals court. That being so, his reasoned
sentencing judgment, resting upon an effort to filter the Guide-
lines' general advice through § 3553(a)'s list of factors, can pro-
vide relevant information to both the court of appeals and ulti-
mately the [ ] Commission. The reasoned responses of these lat-
ter institutions to the sentencing judge's explanation should help
the Guidelines constructively evolve over time, as both Congress
and the Commission foresaw."
72 Id at 2468.
73 Rita, 127 S Ct at 2468.
74 Id.
75 Id at 2469.
76 See id at 2482-83 (Scalia concurring).
77 Rita, 127 S Ct at 2468 (majority).
78 Id at 2469.
79 Id.
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This discussion reflects the Court's belief that the statement of rea-
sons provided by the trial judge plays a central role in the evolution of
the Guidelines.8
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia suggested that reasonableness re-
view could only be procedural;8' nonetheless, procedural review would
have both a direct and indirect impact on uniformity.5 The procedural
provisions established in Booker gave appellate courts the direct means
to reverse a district court.3 Procedural review would also indirectly im-
pact uniformity through the requirement that judges explain their deci-
sions. These explanations, as Justice Scalia argued, would help the Com-
mission tweak the Guidelines to reflect the desirable sentencing practices
of the district courts and "further[] the congressional purpose of ironing
out sentencing differences, and avoiding excessive sentencing dispari-
ties." ' According to Justice Scalia, the Commission's modifications of the
Guidelines would help achieve further uniformity because district courts
would have no reason to depart from the Guidelines range."
D. Ambiguities and Inconsistencies in Rita
The Rita opinion has been criticized for raising more questions
than it answers.5 The circuit split over the standard of review for pro-
cedural reasonableness that emerged less than two months after Rita
was, therefore, foreseeable. "The opinions in Rita reveal[] not only
that the Court is still struggling with its Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence, but also that the Justices have divergent views on many other
dynamic issues raised by the Booker remedy of an advisory guideline
system.""' In fact, several scholars have opined that Rita did very little,
80 See, for example, Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296,326-37 (2004) (Kennedy dissenting)
("Constant, constructive discourse between our courts and our legislatures is an integral and
admirable part of the constitutional design.... Sentencing guidelines are a prime example of this
collaborative process.").
81 Rita, 127 S Ct at 2476 (Scalia concurring). See also Jeffrey S. Sutton, An Appellate Pers-
pective on Federal Sentencing after Booker and Rita, 85 Denver U L Rev 79,83-85 (2007).
82 Rita, 127 S Ct at 2482-83 (Scalia concurring).
83 See note 69 and accompanying text.
84 Rita, 127 S Ct at 2482 (Scalia concurring).
85 Id at 2483 n 7.
86 Douglas A. Berman, Rita, Reasoned Sentencing, and Resistance to Change, 85 Denver U
L Rev 7, 8 (2007). The Rita decision failed to produce a coherent vision of the Court's sentencing
jurisprudence. Although Rita was decided 8-1, with Justice Souter providing the lone dissent, four
separate opinions were written. Justice Breyer wrote for the majority, with Justices Scalia and
Stevens writing concurring opinions. Justices Scalia and Thomas only joined Part III of the ma-
jority opinion, and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg
joined all but Part II of Justice Stevens's concurring opinion.
87 See Part IV.
88 Berman, 85 Denver U L Rev at 8 (cited in note 86).
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if anything, to change the status quo.9 The Court approved the appel-
late courts' adoption of a presumption of reasonableness, while also
approving others circuits' choice to not adopt the presumption. Rita
provides considerable discussion (and endorsement)-in the form of
dicta°-of statements of reasons in support of sentencing determina-
tions, while holding that these statements may be brief when judges
impose "conceptually simple"9 sentences.
Rita's procedural reasonableness holding failed to clarify how the
lower federal courts should (1) determine when conceptually challeng-
ing issues require "the judge to write more extensively"; and (2) craft
common law sentencing doctrines under the advisory system." This
failure is particularly troubling given Booker's assurance that, in the
advisory-Guidelines era, the Commission's collection and analysis of
district courts' sentencing determinations and appellate decisionmak-
ing with respect to these determinations would "move sentencing in
Congress' preferred direction." To be sure, thoroughly reasoned sen-
tencing statements were important components of Congress's objec-
tives of clarifying the sources used to inform sentencing (honesty) and
sentencing defendants in accordance with their level of culpability
(proportionality). 9  Rita appears to have failed at keeping Booker's
promise to honor the SRA.3
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER
"PROCEDURAL REASONABLENESS" POST-RITA
Both the Booker and Rita rulings underscored the importance of
reasoned decisions by the district courts for the evolution of the
Guidelines.6 Nonetheless, Rita concluded that neither the SRA nor
Supreme Court precedent "insist[s] upon a full opinion in every
case." Very shortly after the Rita ruling, the lower appellate courts
89 See, for example, id at 22. According to Professor Berman, "With the Rita decision ap-
pearing to bless the existing post-Booker universe, it is hardly surprising that nearly every major
circuit decision after Rita concludes that the Supreme Court's work is a ratification of that cir-
cuit's pre-Rita jurisprudence." Id.
90 See id at 14.
91 See id at 17, citing Rita, 127 S Ct at 2469.
92 Berman, 85 Denver U L Rev at 17. See also Rita, 127 S Ct at 2482 (Scalia concurring).
93 See Booker, 543 US at 264. See also Rita, 127 S Ct at 2483 (Scalia concurring).
94 See Part V.A.
95 Consider Berman, 85 Denver U L Rev at 22 (cited in note 86) (explaining how courts
have applied Rita such that the outcomes of most cases do not differ from the outcome under
pre-Rita jurisprudence).
96 See Parts II and III.C.
97 Rita, 127 S Ct at 2468.
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were divided over the level of specificity required from the district
courts with respect to § 3553(c) statements.
Rather than a clear dichotomy emerging among the circuits, these
appellate court rulings fall along a spectrum: some requiring very little,
if any, explanation of sentencing determinations and others requiring
thoroughly reasoned and fact-specific sentencing opinions. At one end
of the spectrum are the Seventh and Tenth Circuits' holdings in United
States v Gammicchian and United States v Cereceres-Zavala,9, respec-
tively. These two circuits held that conclusory sentencing opinions are
procedurally reasonable for within-Guidelines sentences and judges
need not discuss parties' specific sentencing arguments.' ° The First and
Sixth Circuits' decisions in United States v Cirilo-Muhoz" and United
States v Thomas,'°2 respectively, are at the other end of the spectrum.
These circuits hold that a district court's sentences are procedurally
unreasonable if sentencing judges' consideration of § 3553(a) factors
and reasoning for imposing the sentence are unclear from the context
and record.'3 In between these positions is the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion in United States v Jones.'°' In Jones, the Eighth Circuit ruled that
district courts' sentencing determinations will be considered procedu-
rally reasonable when the record demonstrates that the sentencing
judge "heard and acknowledged" the parties' sentencing arguments.
Complicating matters even further is an intracircuit conflict that
has emerged in the Seventh Circuit. In Gammicchia, the Seventh Cir-
98 498 F3d 467 (7th Cir 2007).
99 499 F3d 1211 (10th Cir 2007).
100 See Gammicchia, 498 F3d at 469 (holding the sentencing judge's statement that he
weighed the competing § 3553(a) factors was sufficient); Cereceres-Zavala, 499 F3d at 1217
(holding that, although the sentencing judge provided no direct response to Cereceres's requests
for departure, his citation to the PSR's calculation method and recitation of the Guidelines range
was sufficient for § 3553(c) purposes).
101 504 F3d 106 (1st Cir 2007) (per curiam). The First Circuit panel issued three separate
opinions. Judge Juan Torruella voted for remand because the sentence was both substantively
and procedurally unreasonable. Judge Kermit Lipez voted for remand because the sentence was
procedurally unreasonable. Judge Sandra Lynch dissented.
102 498 F3d 336 (6th Cir 2007).
103 See Cirilo-Muhoz, 504 F3d at 123, 126 (Torruella concurring); Thomas, 498 F3d at 341.
The Second Circuit, in United States v Baker, 2007 WL 4006103 (2d Cir), concluded that nonfri-
volous arguments made by a party for a non-Guidelines sentence, at minimum, required the
district court to clearly articulate why it did not consider or choose a non-Guidelines sentence.
See id at *2. The court noted that a district court's statement that it had considered the § 3553(a)
factors is insufficient when "there is nothing in the record [that] show[s] that the district court
actually complied." Id. Baker, however, was a ruling by summary order and therefore has no
precedential effect. See Second Circuit Rule 0.23(b). Nevertheless, under Federal Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 32.1(a) and Second Circuit Rule 0.23(c)(1), citation to summary orders filed after
January 1, 2007, is permitted.
104 493 F3d 938 (8th Cir 2007).
105 See id at 941.
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cuit affirmed a district court's within-Guidelines sentence and did not
require that the judge explain how he accounted for the § 3553(a) fac-
tors. ' Slightly over two months later, a different Seventh Circuit pan-
el, in United States v Miranda," held that a district court must explain
how it considered § 3553(a) factors and why the sentence imposed is
appropriate when a party challenges a within-Guidelines sentence as
unreasonable."' Though Miranda has not explicitly overruled Gam-
micchia, the two opinions have taken contradictory positions regard-
ing what constitutes "procedural reasonableness." 10° Parts IV.A and
IV.B explore how the circuits have interpreted the Supreme Court's
"procedural reasonableness" requirement differently.
A. Seventh and Tenth Circuits: Discussion of Specific § 3553(a)
Factors Is Not Required
Neither the Seventh Circuit nor the Tenth Circuit require the sen-
tencing judge to specifically articulate how the § 3553(a) factors were
considered for within-Guidelines sentences. In Cereceres-Zavala, the
Tenth Circuit reasoned that a within-Guidelines sentence is procedural-
ly reasonable even when the trial judge neither mentions nor expressly
rules on a party's motion for a sentence variance."O The court explained
that, when a sentence falls within the Guidelines range, a district court
need only provide "a general statement of the reasons for its imposition
of the particular sentence". and "nothing in Section 3553(c) requir[es]
a specific explanation.". 2 According to the court, its holding comports
with Rita because "[a]lthough the sentencing court provided no direct
response at all to Cereceres's requests for departure, its citation of the
PSR's calculation method and recitation of the suggested imprison-
ment range amply fulfilled § 3553(c)'s requirement of a general state-
ment noting the appropriate Guidelines range and how it was calcu-
106 See 498 F3d at 469.
107 505 F3d 785 (7th Cir 2007).
108 See id at 791-92.
109 The Miranda opinion does not mention Gammichia and was not part of an en banc
rehearing. See generally id. Courts citing Miranda have not commented on its apparent conflict
with Gammichia and have instead cited the case for different propositions. See, for example,
United States v Padilla, 520 F3d 766, 773 (7th Cir 2008) (citing Miranda for the proposition that
judges should first calculate the advisory-Guidelines range before considering § 3553(a) factors).
Thus, the Seventh Circuit's current position with respect to appellate review in this area is, at
best, unsettled. This confusion is compounded by the fact that some lower courts have cited
Miranda as the basis for justifying very sparse sentencing statements that seem more consistent
with Gammichia. See, for example, United States v Castaldi, 2007 WL 4198215, *4 (ND Ind).
110 See Cereceres-Zavala, 499 F3d at 1217-18.
1Ml Id at 1217.
112 Id.
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lated. '' .. The court also explained that the absence of a thorough ex-
planation by the district court reveals that the judge "must have be-
lieved there was not much more to say.""
Taking a slightly different approach from the Tenth Circuit, which
held that a within-Guidelines sentence is procedurally reasonable even
when the judge does not mention that she considered § 3553(a) factors,
the Seventh Circuit (in Gammicchia) emphasized that the procedural
reasonableness of the appellant's sentence was based upon the fact
that the district court claimed to have considered the § 3553(a) factors."'
The absence of any discussion of the specific factors that were consi-
dered and how these factors were weighed did not render the appel-
lant's sentence procedurally unreasonable. Writing for the court, Judge
Richard Posner noted:
The [§ 3553(a)] factors are intangibles, "weighable" only in a me-
taphorical sense, that the sentencing judge is in a better position
than the appellate judges to place in the balance with competing
considerations. The sentencing judge in this case said he did that
and we have no reason to doubt that he did."6
Thus, the court concluded that appellate review of (properly calculated)
within-Guidelines sentences is necessarily "very limited""7 because
(1) the within-Guidelines sentence already "reflects the confluence of the
judgments of the Sentencing Commission and the sentencing judge";" 8
and (2) the § 3553(a) factors are "vague and nondirectional.."
B. First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits: Discussion of Specific § 3553(a)
Factors Is Required
In the three months following the Seventh Circuit's Gammicchia
ruling, the First, Second, and Sixth Circuits ruled that a sentence is
procedurally unreasonable when the trial record does not make clear
the district judge's consideration of the relevant § 3553(a) factors, in-
cluding the reasoning for imposing the sentence. 21 In Miranda, de-
113 Id.
114 Cereceres-Zavala, 499 F3d at 1217, quoting Rita, 127 S Ct at 2469.
115 See 498 F3d at 469.
116 id at 469.
117 Id at 468.
118 Id. In Miranda, however, the court noted that the Guidelines only reflect general consid-
erations and the district court must focus on § 3553(a) factors as they apply to the particular
defendant. 505 F3d at 796.
119 Gammicchia, 498 F3d at 468-69.
120 See Cirilo-Muhoz, 504 F3d at 123; Baker, 2007 WL 4006103 at *2; Thomas, 498 F3d at
341. As discussed in note 103, the Second Circuit's Baker decision lacks precedential effect be-
cause it was a summary order.
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cided a mere few months after Gammicchia, the Seventh Circuit also
went against its statements in Gammicchia and required that a district
court explain the reasoning for imposing a sentence.21
In one of the clearest articulations for the need to provide rea-
sons for sentencing determination, the Sixth Circuit stated that the
Rita decision
reinforces [the] conclusion that reasonableness review requires
[an inquiry] into both the length of the sentence and the factors
evaluated and the procedures employed by the district court in
reaching its sentencing determination. Rita exhorts the sentenc-
ing judge to satisfy the procedural requirement of [setting] forth
enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the
parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his
own legal decisionmaking authority. '
Based on its reading of Rita, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that proper
appellate review requires the court to examine the sentencing transcript
to determine whether (1) the judge adequately considered the relevant
§ 3553(a) factors and clearly stated his reasons for imposing the chosen
sentence; and (2) the sentence imposed was substantively reasonable.'
While recognizing that the Rita decision made clear that the amount of
reasoning required varies according to context, the Sixth Circuit em-
phasized that the appellate courts must vacate a sentence when the trial
judge's reasoning is not clear from the context and record.""
Similarly, the First Circuit emphasized that the duty of the courts
of appeals in determining the reasonableness of a particular sentence
is to conduct an "analysis of the sentence and the reasons given by the
sentencing court in reaching its conclusions, tested against the record
of the case to determine whether the reasoning is supported by the
record, and ultimately, whether the sentence is reasonable.12. Accord-
121 See Miranda, 505 F3d at 796.
122 Thomas, 498 F3d at 339-40 (quotation marks and citations omitted), quoting United
States v Liou, 491 F3d 334, 338 (6th Cir 2007).
123 Thomas, 498 F3d at 340, quoting Liou, 491 F3d at 339.
124 Thomas, 498 F3d at 340, quoting Liou, 491 F3d at 338, 339 n 4. The court acknowledged
that the district court's statements bore some resemblance to the statement of reasons approved
by the Supreme Court in Rita but distinguished the case at hand. 498 F3d at 341. Whereas the
record in Rita made clear that the trial judge considered Rita's arguments before rejecting them,
the record in Thomas failed to provide such clarity. See id.
The dissent in Thomas noted that a "ritual incantation of the factors" by the trial judge was
not required to affirm a sentence. See 498 F3d at 342 (Forester dissenting). The majority pointed
out, however, that it was the dissent, and not the district court, that summarized many of defen-
dant's arguments for a reduced sentence and put forth reasons why these arguments may have
been rejected by the district court. See id at 341 n 3 (majority). The majority asserted that it was
not the duty of the appellate court to supply reasons for the imposed sentence. See id.
125 Cirilo-Muiloz, 504 F3d at 118 (Torruella concurring).
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ing to the court, Rita underscored that: (1) thoroughly reasoned sen-
tencing statements are crucial in assisting appellate courts in conduct-
ing reasonableness review and furthering the "weighty goals of trans-
parency and credibility for the justice system";'26 (2) the district court's
rationale for a sentencing determination "offers the defendant, the
government, the victim, and the public a window into the decision-
making process[,] ... promot[ing] respect for the adjudicative process,
by demonstrating the serious reflection and deliberation that under-
lies each criminal sentence"; 2' and (3) the district court's focus on the
Guidelines range, rather than the rationale for the sentence, "is utterly
at odds with the requirements of § 3553(c) and the important public
goals served by the sentencing explanation."" The First Circuit also
stressed that the heavy workload of the district courts was no excuse
for inadequate explanations because nothing district courts do is more
important than sentencing decisions U9 and "[t]he requirement that a
statement of reasons be given is hardly ... a mere formalism.''1n
Shortly after Gammicchia, a different Seventh Circuit panel, in Mi-
randa, held that "[w]hen a defendant challenges a within-[G]uidelines
sentence as unreasonable, the judge must explain why the sentence im-
posed is appropriate in light of the section 3553(a) factors.'' The Mi-
randa court further stated that "a rote statement that the judge consi-
dered all of the relevant factors will not always suffice.'. 2 While ac-
knowledging that some circumstances will only require brief explana-
tions, and arguments that are clearly without merit can "be passed over
in silence,' ' the court cautioned that "when a court gives little or no
attention to the defendant's principal [nonfrivolous] argument ... we
cannot have confidence that the judge adequately considered the sec-
tion 3553(a) factors.' '. Furthermore, when the judge fails to comment,
she "is likely to have committed an error or oversight.' '3  According to
126 Id at 132 (Lipez concurring).
127 Id.
128 Id at 133. See also Rita, 127 S Ct at 2468 (Scalia concurring) ("Confidence in a judge's
use of reason underlies the public's trust in the judicial institution. A public statement of those
reasons helps provide the public with the assurance that creates that trust.").
129 Cirilo-Muhoz, 504 F3d at 132 (Lipez concurring).
130 Id at 135-36. According to Judge Juan Torruella, the district court's statement was
procedurally unreasonable because it provided too little insight into its reasoning. Id at 123
(Torruella concurring).
131 Miranda, 505 F3d at 792.
132 Id at 796, citing United States v Cunningham, 429 F3d 673, 679 (7th Cir 2005). See also
United States v Cooper, 437 F3d 324,329 (3d Cir 2006).
133 Miranda, 505 F3d at 792. "If anyone acquainted with the facts would have known with-
out being told why the judge had not accepted the argument, then the judge need not specifically
comment on that argument." Id.
134 Id at 792.
135 Id.
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the Seventh Circuit, the ultimate test of whether a sentencing judge's
explanation is sufficient for the purposes of Rita is if the appellate
court can tell whether the district court made an individualized analy-
sis of the party's factually and legally supported sentencing arguments
under § 3553(a).'m
C. Eighth Circuit: § 3553(a) Factors Need Only Be
"Heard and Acknowledged"
Less than three weeks after the Supreme Court's ruling in Rita,
the Eighth Circuit ruled that under Rita, a simple statement of reasons
would satisfy § 3553(c) when it is obvious from the record that the
sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments.3 In Jones, the
court concluded that the record sufficiently demonstrated that the dis-
trict court "heard and acknowledged" the arguments from both Jones
and the government. The court also explained that it had "not held that
the brevity of the record alone gives rise to a claim of per se unreasona-
bleness." Jones recognized that a prior Eighth Circuit ruling "urge[d]
each district court to make a clear record of its reasons for imposing a
particular sentence with explicit reference to § 3553(a),"13' but the court
also noted that "[i]t is not necessary for the district court to provide a
mechanical recitation of the § 3553(a) factors so long as it is clear
from the record that the court considered them."' 4
D. Summary
The circuits disagree over the proper standard for determining
procedural reasonableness after the Supreme Court's ruling in Rita.
Tne Tenth Circuit and one Seventh Circuit panel (in Gammicchia)
have held that district courts are not required to discuss how they con-
sidered and weighed specific § 3553(a) factors when imposing within-
Guidelines sentences. In contrast, the First and Sixth Circuits, as well
as a different Seventh Circuit panel (in Miranda), ruled that sentenc-
ing judges must specifically address parties' nonfrivolous sentencing
arguments, and that the reasoning for a particular sentence must be
clear from the trial record. In the middle of these positions is the
Eighth Circuit's holding in Jones. Similar to the First and Sixth Cir-
cuits, the Jones court emphasized the importance of context and
record in determining the adequacy of § 3553(c) statements. But Jones
136 Id at 796.
137 Jones, 493 F3d at 941.
138 Id at 940.
139 Id at 941.
140 Id.
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did not go as far as Thomas or Cirilo-Muhoz in underscoring the im-
portance of identifying and understanding the trial judge's reasoning
behind imposing a particular sentence. The Jones court held that a
sentence was reasonable if the record demonstrates that the district
court has "heard and acknowledged" the parties claims.14' Jones also
did not go as far as the Seventh Circuit in Gammicchia, which stated
that such appeals were frivolous. Rather, Jones was satisfied with the
district court's conclusory statement regarding its consideration, and
ultimate rejection, of the appellant's § 3553(a) claims.
V. ASSESSING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Circuits on both sides of the split highlight language in the Rita opi-
nion as supporting their interpretation of the procedural reasonableness
requirement. Recall that the Seventh (in Gammicchia), Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits note that the Supreme Court refuses to read the SRA or
prior case law as insisting that district courts provide thorough explana-
tions of sentencing determinations when parties present nonfrivolous
arguments requesting a non-Guidelines sentence. The First, Sixth, and
Seventh (in Miranda) Circuits focus on Rita's lengthy discussion of the
importance of the district court clearly demonstrating how it considered
the parties' sentencing arguments. Also recall that the Second Circuit, in
a ruling lacking precedential effect, interprets Rita as requiring the dis-
trict court to clearly state why it did not consider or choose a non-
Guidelines sentence when a party makes a nonfrivolous argument.'42
Given the obvious inconsistencies and ambiguities in Rita's procedural
reasonableness holding, it is somewhat surprising that the circuits fail
to explicitly and thoroughly harmonize their reading of Rita with Book-
er and the SRA in order to buttress their reasoning.4 1 Such an analysis
is critical to understanding and clarifying the procedural component of
reasonableness review in the advisory-Guidelines era.
Which circuits read Rita correctly and why? How can these various
readings be reconciled with the SRA and Booker? Part V.A discusses
the considerable power that the SRA gave the federal judiciary to devel-
141 Jones, 493 F3d at 941.
142 See note 103.
143 In his concurrence in Cirilo-Mufioz, Judge Lipez emphasized the importance of sentencing
explanations to the overall sentencing scheme and the increased importance of district courts'
sentencing explanations in the post-Booker world. 504 F3d at 131-32 (Lipez concurring). Judge
Lipez also noted that sentencing explanations "furtherf the weighty goals of transparency and
credibility for the justice system." Id at 132. However, while Judge Lipez explicitly addressed these
issues, his treatment cannot be considered "thorough" because he neglected to specifically draw
from the language in Booker and the text and legislative history of the SRA to fully support and
justify his reasoning. Moreover, Judge Lipez failed to discuss the considerable power and influence
that Congress gave the federal judiciary to develop and shape sentencing practices and policy.
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op and shape sentencing policy and how this power was meant to oper-
ate primarily through judges' reasoned sentencing opinions. Part V.B
argues that the First, Sixth, and Seventh (in Miranda) Circuits' reading
of Rita is most consistent with both the SRA's and Booker's emphasis
on transparency and rationality in the sentencing process.
A. The SRA and the Judiciary's Intended Role in Sentencing Reform
The SRA requires that judges play a central role in developing
better-reasoned, uniform sentencing. The SRA attempted to make it
easier for judges to determine how and why other judges ruled in
similar situations by providing them with the necessary language and
tools to describe the qualities -offense and offender facts-that make
offenders similar to or dissimilar from one other.'" Under the SRA,
the federal judiciary retains considerable power to develop a common
law of sentencing and shape the content and direction of federal sen-
tencing law. ' This influence operates primarily through judges' rea-
soned opinions, which allow judges to contribute their insights and
wisdom to the development of rules governing federal sentencing.
'46
As this Part discusses, both the text of the SRA and the legislative
history reveal that Congress expected judges to have an influential
role in the sentencing process. '
The SRA focuses on clarifying the sources used to inform sentenc-
ing (transparency) and sentencing defendants in a manner consistent
with the severity of their particular conduct (rationality). This focus on
transparency and rationality made careful judicial reasoning, demon-
strated through § 3553(c) statements, central to the Guidelines.' 48 These
144 See Senate Report at 59-60 (cited in note 4).
145 See id. The Senate Report explains that a judge's statement of reasons for imposing a
particular sentence can be used by each participant in the criminal justice system, including
appellate courts reviewing sentences, to assist in the development of a consistent sentencing
philosophy. See also Berman, 11 Stan L & Policy Rev at 99 (cited in note 2).
146 See Berman, 11 Stan L & Policy Rev at 103-04 (cited in note 2).
147 See Kate Stith and Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 Wake Forest L Rev 223,244 (1993):
Critics of the idea of an administrative sentencing commission expressed the fear that its
sentencing guidelines might unduly limit the discretion of the sentencing court.... As if to
respond to this concern, the measure approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee in late
1977 deliberately granted the sentencing judge significant discretion to depart from the re-
levant guideline sentence.
148 Commission Report at 12 (cited in note 4). "The guidelines impose a logical and rational
order on most federal offenses and clarify the ambiguities that result from having a superfluity of
sections describing virtually identical conduct.... In short, the guidelines have helped to ratio-
nalize the federal criminal law." Id at 136. "Transparency was advanced by requiring each judge
to state in open court the reason for its imposition of the particular sentence and to provide a
written record of these reasons." Id at 12 (quotation marks omitted).
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statements by trial judges, combined with appellate review, were key to
the dialogues within the judiciary and between the judiciary and the
Commission, which was designed to help "develop means of measur-
ing the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional prac-
tices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing.'.' The Se-
nate Report supporting the SRA states:
The [SRA] requires the sentencing judge to announce how the
guidelines apply to each defendant and to give his reasons for the
sentence imposed. The judge is also required to give the reason
for imposing sentence at a particular point within the guidelines or,
if the sentence is outside the guidelines, specific reasons for impos-
ing a sentence of a different kind or length than recommended in
the guidelines.
The statement of reasons can be used by each participant in the
Federal criminal justice system charged with reviewing or imple-
menting a sentence. It will assist the appellate courts in reviewing
the reasonableness of a sentence outside the guidelines, and in de-
termining whether a sentence within the guidelines is the result of
correct or incorrect application of the guidelines.15 °
Congress believed these carefully contemplated and thoroughly
justified sentencing determinations would enable judges to contribute
their own insights, experiences, and wisdom to a common law dialogue
about sentencing policy and practice."' The Guidelines encourage both
moral judgment and moral reasoning, and judges are expected to "pro-
nounce and defend in a principled fashion the way in which [broad nor-
mative concerns] find expression in specific sentencing outcomes.' '. In
upholding the constitutionality of the SRA in Mistretta v United States,"'
the Supreme Court commended Congress's effort to capitalize on the
"uniquely judicial view on the uniquely judicial subject of sentencing. '14
Pursuant to 28 USC § 994(o)-(p), the Commission periodically re-
views and revises previously promulgated Guidelines and submits these
amendments to Congress no later than the first day of May each year.
On July 31, 2007, the Commission published a notice of policy priori-
149 28 USC § 991(b)(2). See also Ronald E Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Admin-
istrative Law Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 Cal L Rev 1, 17,22 (1991).
150 Senate Report at 59-60 (cited in note 4) (citations omitted); See also Commission Re-
port at 12 (cited in note 4).
151 See Senate Report at 60 (cited in note 4). See also Norval Morris, Towards Principled
Sentencing, 37 Md L Rev 267, 274-75 (1977) (arguing that judges are better suited than legisla-
tures to consider "the subtleties of crime-to-criminal relationships essential to just sentencing").
152 Berman, 11 Stan L & Policy Rev at 103-04 (cited in note 2).
153 488 US 361 (1989).
154 Id at 408.
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ties identifying nine objectives." ' Of particular relevance to the current
discussion concerning the centrality of § 3553(c) statements in sen-
tencing reform was the third objective:
Continuation of [the Commission's] work with the congressional,
executive, and judicial branches of the government and other in-
terested parties on appropriate responses to United States v. Book-
er and United States v. Rita including any appropriate amendments
to the guidelines or other changes to the Guidelines Manual to re-
flect those decisions, as well as continuation of its monitoring and
analysis of post-Booker federal sentencing practices, data, case law,
and other feedback, including reasons for departures and variances
stated by sentencing courts."6
Consistent with the SRA, the Commission emphasized the impor-
tance of monitoring and analyzing judicial reasoning in sentencing
determinations. It is surprising, however, that the Commission seems
to limit this focus to departures and variances when the Supreme Court
has held otherwise."' Booker commands appellate courts to consider
whether the district court accounted for relevant § 3553(a) factors,"
and Rita makes clear that the rebuttability of the presumption of rea-
sonableness for a sentence within the Guidelines range is "real" and
that appellate courts must review sentences individually whether they
are inside or outside that range."9 When either party presents nonfrivol-
ous reasons for imposing a non-Guidelines sentence, it must be clear
from either the record or the § 3553(c) statement why the judge re-
jected those arguments.'60
B. I--nnoring the SRA: Requiring Transparency and Rationality in
Federal Sentencing Post-Booker
The SRA has always contained sections that invited subjectivity
and potentially compromised consistency and predictability.'6' Although
these provisions have been criticized for conflicting with the congres-
155 See Commission, Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed Reg 41795 (2007).
156 Id (emphasis added).
157 But see Ilya Beylin, Comment, Booker's Unnoticed Victim: The Importance of Providing
Notice Prior to Sua Sponte Non-Guidelines Sentences, 74 U Chi L Rev 961, 976 (2007) ("The
legal force of pre-Booker rules and doctrines applying the departure concept as established in
[§ 3553(b)(1) has been] annihilated.").
158 See 543 US at 261.
159 See 127 S Ct at 2473-74 (Stevens concurring).
160 Id at 2468.
161 Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon
Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L Rev 1,13-14 (1988).
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sional objectives of honesty, uniformity, and proportionality,'62 both
Congress and the Supreme Court believe that such disciplined discre-
tion is integral to the proper functioning and evolution of the Guide-
lines.'63 Transparency and rationality in the sentencing process, facili-
tated through "thoughtful, dynamic, sophisticated and purposeful sen-
tencing opinions,"" were important components of this desired evolu-
tion.'65 As discussed in Part II, the Supreme Court, in Booker, assured
Congress that the advisory-Guidelines system would retain many im-
portant features of the SRA that would "continue to move sentencing
in Congress' preferred direction.""
Despite the subjectivity of sentencing decisions, district courts
must clearly explain the reasoning for their sentencing decisions to
enable appellate courts to conduct the proper type of review.'7 Con-
gress and the Supreme Court require federal appellate courts to give
appropriate deference to district courts' sentencing determination.
Rita also clarified that the new standard of review in the advisory-
Guidelines era would be abuse of discretion, replacing the de novo re-
view standard for non-Guidelines sentences in the pre-Booker era. De-
ference to a sentencing determination, however, requires that the appel-
late court understand the basis for that determination.' 6 This logic is
supported in the recent decision, Gall v United States,1" in which the
Court underscored the fact that an appellate court must clearly demon-
strate that the district court abused its discretion based on the sen-
tencing judge's reasoned decision.'70 The Court explained that the cir-
cuit court's analysis of what it believed to be different errors in the
district court's reasoning "more closely resembled de novo review.'' 7'
Similarly, the de facto mandatory system likely to result from ap-
pellate courts adopting a presumption of reasonableness for within-
Guidelines sentences but not requiring clear reasons for such sentences
would be in tension with Booker and Rita as well.'72 As Booker and Rita
162 See Paul J. Hofer and Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason behind the Rules: Finding and
Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 Am Crim L Rev 19,75-80 (2003).
163 See the discussion in Parts II and V.A.
164 Berman, 11 Stan L & Policy Rev at 106 (cited in note 2).
165 See Commission Report at 12 (cited in note 4).
166 Booker, 543 US at 264.
167 Although Rita does not articulate a clear legal standard for the procedural component
of reasonable review, the Court requires that district courts subject defendants' sentences "to the
thorough adversarial testing contemplated by federal sentencing procedure." 127 S Ct at 2465.
168 See Cirilo-Muhoz 504 F3d at 132 ("In short, [appellate courts] cannot do [their] job of
appellate review if [they] must guess at the reasons underlying the district court's sentence.").
169 128 S Ct 586 (2007).
170 See id at 600-02.
171 Id at 600.
172 See Berman and Bibas, 4 Ohio St J Crim L at 70 (cited in note 45).
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underscored, and Gall reiterated, while the Guidelines are advisory,
the application of § 3553(a) is mandatory.'7 3 Thus, the most important
task of the appellate courts is to ensure that the district court gave the
§ 3553(a) factors meaningful consideration, regardless of whether the
sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range. Furthermore,
district courts must demonstrate that they truly treated the Guidelines
as advisory in order for their sentences to comport with Booker." Un-
der the framework established by the SRA, courts demonstrate their
independent determination of a defendant's sentence by providing
carefully reasoned sentencing opinions. "
The Commission referred to the increased transparency and ratio-
nality in federal sentencing as "the most basic achievement of sentencing
reform ... so fundamental that it can easily be taken for granted.' 7. The
remainder of this Comment argues that thoroughly reasoned judicial
opinions remain key components of this "basic achievement" sentencing
reform as envisioned by the SRA, and that the approach of the First,
Second, Sixth, and Seventh (in Miranda) Circuits is most consistent with
these objectives.
1. Transparency.
Transparency in sentencing greatly increases congressional and
judicial understanding of the reasons for variation in sentencing.'"
Such transparency remains necessary to "dispel concerns that sen-
tences vary arbitrarily among judges, or that irrelevant factors, such as
race or ethnicity significantly affect sentencing.' 78 Moreover, transpa-
rency "facilitate[s] debate and evaluation of the merits of particular
policies" as well as assists in the anticipation of the effects of changes
in sentencing policy.' Perhaps more importantly, transparency "re-
duces the possibility of surprise and confusion regarding the reasons
for the sentence ultimately imposed.""0 Transparent sentencing opi-
nions also facilitate the development and maintenance of "the richest
sources of information that have ever been assembled on federal
173 See Rita, 127 S Ct at 2463.
174 See 543 US at 251. Booker addressed the Sixth Amendment concerns raised in Apprendi
by permitting judges to find sentencing facts to increase defendants' Guidelines range so long as
the Guidelines are treated as advisory.
175 See Part V.A.
176 Commission Report at 136 (cited in note 4).
177 Id at 137.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Commission Report at 12 (cited in note 4).
2008] 1909
The University of Chicago Law Review
crimes, federal offenders, and sentences imposed, and are invaluable
resources for policy research.....
Rita emphasized that the district judges should "set forth enough
[detail] to satisfy the appellate court that [they] ha[ve] considered the
parties' arguments and ha[ve] a reasoned basis for exercising [their]
own legal decision-making authority..... The First, Sixth, and Seventh (in
Miranda) Circuits understand Rita unambiguously to require the courts
of appeals to inquire about the "factors evaluated and the procedures
employed by the district court in reaching its sentencing determina-
tion. ' 83 This interpretation ensures that the context and record leave no
doubt about "the district court's consideration of the relevant § 3553(a)
factors and its reasoning for imposing the sentence that it did."'
8'
While acknowledging that the extent of the reasoning required
from the district court varies with context, the First, Sixth, and Seventh
(in Miranda) Circuits require that the sentencing judge make her rea-
soning clear in either the trial transcript or official sentencing statement.
These rulings honor the flexibility established in Rita of examining the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the district court's sentenc-
ing determination, but refuse to infer a rationale that is not readily
identifiable from the context and record."5 Conversely, the Seventh (in
Gammicchia), Eighth, and Tenth Circuit rulings allow district courts'
sentencing determinations to remain rather opaque, save their reference
to the now-advisory Guidelines. The Tenth Circuit condoned the district
court's failure to directly respond to either of the defendant's motions
for a sentencing reduction based on § 3553(a) factors, reasoning that
the context and record of the sentencing hearing made the judge's
rationale clear. However, in defending the outcome, the court was un-
able to identify anything other than the district court's reliance on the
PSR's calculation of the suggested Guidelines range.'& Slightly less
disturbingly, the Eighth Circuit understands Rita's procedural reason-
ableness requirement to be satisfied when the record reveals that the
181 Id at 137.
182 127 S Ct at 2468.
183 Thomas, 498 F3d at 339-40, quoting United States v Liou, 491 F3d 334, 338 (6th Cir 2007).
See also Miranda, 505 F3d at 796; Cirilo-Muhoz, 504 F3d at 135; Baker, 2007 WL 4006103 at *2.
184 Thomas, 498 F3d at 341.
185 See Cirilo-Muhoz, 504 F3d at 132; United States v Cunningham, 429 F3d 673,679 (2005).
Section 3553(c)(1), the provision of the SRA requiring district courts to provide specific reasons
for within-Guidelines sentences when the Guidelines range exceeds twenty-four months lends
further support to the First and Sixth Circuits' reading of Rita-both Thomas's (210 to 262
months) and Cirilo-Muhoz's (324 to 405 months) Guidelines ranges well exceeded that thre-
shold. In Baker, the nonbinding Second Circuit ruling, the sentencing range also exceeded twen-
ty-four months (108 to 135 months).
186 See Cereceres-Zavala, 499 F3d at 1217.
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district court "heard and acknowledged" the parties' arguments,' 7 al-
though the Rita ruling emphasized the importance of "reasoned" deci-
sions by judges."' Similarly, the Seventh Circuit (in Gammicchia) is
satisfied with a district judge's simple assertion that the defendant's
arguments were considered.
Granted, the Seventh (in Gammicchia), Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
note that Rita allowed brief sentencing explanations when judges impose
"conceptually simple" sentences, but these circuits fail to articulate why
the sentences in these particular circumstances were conceptually sim-
ple other than stating that the sentences were within the properly calcu-
lated Guidelines range.'2 These circuits also largely ignore Rita's consi-
derable discussion and endorsement of thoroughly reasoned sentencing
decisions to promote public trust in the federal judiciary, proper appel-
late review, and the evolving rationality of the sentencing process.
2. Rationality and evolution of the Guidelines.
The SRA was initially part of a larger project to revise the federal
criminal code.9 Although that overarching project ultimately was
abandoned, the Guidelines were intended to bring order and structure
to the criminal code. In particular, the Guidelines were developed-
through the systematic classification of offenders and offenses and
through the establishment of specific adjustments for aggravating and
mitigating circumstances -to permit the proper tailoring of punish-
ment bases of the unique characteristics of a case.'9' The SRA also
sought to advance rationality by requiring the Commission to "develop
policies and practices that reflect ... advancement in knowledge of hu-
man behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process."' ' 4
According to the SRA, the rationality of sentencing evolves
through judges contributing their insights, experiences, and wisdom to
sentencing policy and practice, and through judges defending in a prin-
cipled manner how the congressional objectives "find expression in
187 See Jones, 493 F3d at 941.
188 The Jones ruling also appears in tension with Eighth Circuit precedent emphasizing that
district courts must "elucidate their reasoning when sentencing defendants in order to assist
reviewing courts and to avoid needless appeals." United States v Myers, 439 F3d 415, 418-19 (8th
Cir 2006).
189 See Part IVA.
190 Moreover, § 3553(c)(1)'s requirement of specific reasons for sentences in Guidelines
ranges exceeding twenty-four months suggests that Congress did not believe that within-
Guideline sentences were inherently "conceptually simple." See note 185.
191 See Part III.C.
192 Commission Report at 2,136 (cited in note 4).
193 Id at v.
194 Id at 12.
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specific sentencing outcomes."M Moreover, the SRA intended for
§ 3553(c) statements to be used by each participant in the criminal
justice system charged with reviewing and implementing a sentence.9' It
is therefore necessary that district courts clearly spell out their reason-
ing for sentencing determinations in order for appellate courts and the
Commission to fulfill their obligations to intelligently interpret and eva-
luate the district courts' reasons for imposing sentences in each case.197
To be sure, judges will often provide contradictory (and sometimes
only marginally relevant) information and there likely always will re-
main a certain degree of unpredictability, but the rationalizing and evo-
lutionary import of these sentencing explanations is not diminished by
this fact. As mentioned above, the Commission continuously collects and
analyzes these data to detect trends-both subtle and obvious-in pu-
nishment as it relates to specific attributes of offenders and offenses.
Along with several of their sister circuits, the First, Sixth, and Se-
venth (in Miranda) Circuit rulings recognize that § 3553(a) factors are,
in fact, tangible, and appellate courts can assess whether the district
court considered and applied these factors in a reasonable manner."'
These circuits' rulings comport with the Commission's recently an-
nounced policy priority of "continu[ing] [ ] its monitoring and analysis
of post-Booker federal sentencing practices ... including reasons for
departures and variances stated by sentencing courts."'9 This monitor-
ing and analysis can only occur if judges provide clear explanations for
their sentencing decisions.
Writing for the majority in Gammicchia, Judge Posner justifies
the appellate court's acceptance of the district court's simple assertion
that § 3553(a) factors were considered as procedurally reasonable on
the grounds that such factors are "vague and nondirectional" and only
weighable in a metaphorical sense." Not only does this reasoning appear
to be inconsistent with the SRA, Booker, and Rita, but it also appears to
take a position inconsistent with Seventh Circuit's ruling less than two
weeks earlier in United States v Goldberg, ' for which Judge Posner also
authored the court's opinion. In Goldberg, the court held that sentencing
judges must "conscientiously consider the factors set forth in [§ 3553(a)]
195 See Berman, 11 Stan L & Policy Rev at 104 (cited in note 2).
196 See Senate Report at 60 (cited in note 4).
197 See Breyer, 17 Hofstra L Rev at 7-8,18 (cited in note 161). See also Part V.A.
198 See Miranda, 505 F3d at 792; Cirilo-Muhoz, 504 F3d at 118; Thomas, 498 F3d at 339-40.
See also Tomko, 498 F3d at 163; United States v Crisp, 454 F3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir 2006); United
States v Haack, 403 F3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir 2005). These rulings underscore the belief that appellate
courts are capable of assessing whether the district court adequately weighed the relevant factors.
199 72 Fed Reg at 41795 (cited in note 155).
200 Tomko, 498 F3d at 468-69.
201 491 F3d 668 (7th Cir 2007).
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to guide sentencing" and found the district court's weighing of § 3553(a)
factors "odd" and "unreasonable.".... Granted, Goldberg involved an out-
side-Guidelines sentence, but that does not alter the fact that the court
critiqued the sentencing judge's weighing of § 3553(a) factors. Moreover,
both the Booker and Rita opinions clearly emphasize the significance of
reasoned sentencing opinions to the evolution of the Guidelines.3 It is
unlikely that such an evolution is possible if Rita only requires judges to
simply mention that certain § 3553(a) factors were considered without
saying more for within-Guidelines sentences.!
3. Rebuttability of the presumption of reasonableness.
Rita makes clear that appellate courts must review sentences in-
dividually whether they are inside or outside the Guidelines range,
irrespective of whether the reviewing court has adopted a presump-
tion of reasonableness. The Court noted that even when imposing a
sentence within the Guidelines, district courts would normally explain
the reasons for rejecting the arguments put forth by the parties re-
questing a different sentence. ' It is unlikely that the Court intended
for the district courts to completely ignore a party's nonfrivolous
claims or deem such appeals frivolous merely because the trial judge
imposed a sentence consistent with the advisory-Guidelines range and
stated that she considered the § 3553(a) factors. 7
The Seventh (in Gammicchia), Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, how-
ever, place considerable emphasis on the fact that the district court
imposed a within-Guidelines sentence in their explanations of why the
district courts' conclusory sentencing statements were acceptable. Re-
call that in Justice Souter's dissent in Rita, he predicted that sentenc-
ing judges would rather give a sentence in the Guidelines range than
go through the factfinding necessary to justify a sentence outside the
range." But Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, suggested that Justice
202 Id at 671,673.
203 See Parts I and III.C. In Rita, Justice Breyer remarked that the trial judge's "reasoned
sentencing judgment, resting upon an effort to filter the Guidelines' general advice through
§ 3553(a)'s list of factors, can provide relevant information to both the court of appeals and ulti-
mately the [ ] Commission," and that "reasoned responses of these latter institutions to the sentencing
judge's explanation should help the Guidelines constructively evolve over time." 127 S Ct at 2469.
204 See note 198. According to the circuits that have held § 3553(a) factors are tangible and
weighable, the issue before the appellate court is not whether it has any reason to doubt the
district judge's statement that § 3553(a) factors were considered, but whether the appellate court
can follow, recreate, and assess the district court's basis for the sentence.
205 See 127 S Ct at 2473. See also note 41 and accompanying text.
206 See 127 S Ct at 2468. See also Gall, 128 S Ct at 596.
207 See United States v Taylor, 487 US 326, 336-37 (1988).
208 See note 68 and accompanying text.
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Souter "overestimates the 'gravitational pull' towards the advisory
Guidelines that will result from a presumption of reasonableness," as
well as emphasized the fact that the presumption was strictly "appellate"
and not available to the district courts.'" Justice Stevens's view that Jus-
tice Souter's concerns are unwarranted is, of course, an empirical-
rather than conceptual-matter. However, by allowing judges to merely
state that § 3553(a) factors were considered without explicitly demon-
strating how the calculus was made, it would be extremely easy-and
perhaps even tempting -for district courts to impose within-Guidelines
sentences that were not specifically tailored to defendants save for
reference to the advisory Guidelines. This approach would undermine
important objectives in the SRA as well as Rita's refusal to allow the
presumption of reasonableness for within-Guideline sentences to car-
ry over to the choice of sentence by the district court."
Moreover, as discussed above, a de facto mandatory system is likely
to result if appellate courts adopt a presumption of reasonableness for
within-Guidelines sentences without requiring district courts to provide
clear and detailed statements of how § 3553(a) factors were considered.
Such a system may violate Apprendi and Booker in those situations
where a judge relies on facts not found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt to enhance the Guidelines range. Under the post-Booker regime,
sentencing statements perform the function of demonstrating to the
appellate courts that the Guidelines are being used in an advisory, ra-
ther than a mandatory, manner.
Since the enactment of the Guidelines, many judges have com-
plained about the time-intensive process of sentencing,"' so it is incum-
bent upon the appellate courts to establish procedural rules that facili-
tate-if not compel -thoughtful, deliberative, and purposeful decision-
making. ' Some scholars suggest that judges' complaints about sentenc-
ing possibly reveal their general disinclination to devote the necessary
resources toward improving the new sentencing system."' Professor Ro-
nald Wright has argued that the most significant danger of overly routi-
nized sentencing is "attitudinal assimilation" by judges." Over-reliance
on the Guidelines potentially numbs judges' sensitivity to potential con-
flicts between the Guidelines and statutory or constitutional require-
209 127 S Ct at 2473 (Stevens concurring).
210 Id.
211 See Robert W. Sweet, D. Evan van Hook, and Edward V. Di Lello, Towards a Common
Law of Sentencing: Developing Judicial Precedent in Cyberspace, 65 Fordham L Rev 927,940 (1996).
212 Berman, 11 Stan L & Policy Rev at 106 (cited in note 2).
213 See Rita, 127 S Ct at 2482 (Scalia concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
214 Berman, 11 Stan L & Policy Rev at 106 (cited in note 2).
215 Wright, 79 Cal L Rev at 43 (cited in note 149).
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ments.' ' When this desensitization occurs, the judiciary has forfeited the
independence that makes the office distinctive from an administrative
agency."' Moreover, judges are less likely to take personal responsibility
for imposing an appropriate sentence."8 Professor Wright also believes
that one of the strongest virtues of the federal judiciary is that judges
are less susceptible to private influence and that some form of judicial
review of the Commission could help remedy these shortcomings of
overly routinized sentencing. The Seventh (in Gammicchia), Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits' over-reliance on the fact that sentences are within
the Guidelines possibly reflect this attitudinal assimilation.n°
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the SRA with the express purpose of providing
more predictability, less unwarranted judicial discretion, and greater
transparency in federal sentencing.' Congress expected the judiciary to
have an influential role in developing and shaping sentencing law and
policy, operating primarily through sentencing judges' carefully rea-
soned judicial opinions and appellate review of these sentences.22 ' The
Commission sought to advance the SRA's objectives by creating the
Guidelines that properly balance uniformity in sentencing with some
limited flexibility for individualization when appropriate.2 At least two
of these congressionally mandated objectives-transparency and ratio-
nality-may have been undermined by the Supreme Court's recent
ruling in Rita, which established the vague standard that the procedural
reasonableness of a district judge's sentencing determination would
vary according to the context and record. Almost immediately following
the Rita decision, a split emerged among the circuits over the level of
specificity required from the district courts with respect to these deter-
minations. While the Seventh (in Gammicchia), Eighth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits have concluded that trial judges need not offer specific explana-
tions for a within-Guidelines sentence, the First, Sixth, and Seventh (in
Miranda) Circuits have disagreed, ruling that the district court must
make clear its consideration of § 3553(a) factors and reasoning for impos-
ing a particular sentence.
216 Id.
217 Id. See also Harold Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 Tex L Rev
207,237-38 (1984).
218 Wright, 79 Cal L Rev at 44 (cited in note 149).
219 Id.
220 See Berman, 85 Denver U L Rev at 19-22 (cited in note 86).
221 See Senate Report at 59-60 (cited in note 4).
222 Id.
223 Commission Report at 11 (cited in note 4).
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This Comment argued that the statutory language and legislative
history of the SRA, as well as the Supreme Court's recent rulings in
Booker and Rita-underscoring the importance of reasoned decisions by
the district courts and requiring meaningful consideration of § 3553(a)
factors in sentencing determinations- are most consistent with the ap-
proach adopted by the First, Sixth, and Seventh (in Miranda) Circuits.
At a more fundamental level, the First, Sixth, and Seventh (in Miranda)
Circuits' approach is representative of the role the SRA intended for
the judiciary to serve in the evolution of sentencing jurisprudence.
